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Unenumerated Rights in Different Democratic Regimes

Are Lochner v. New York and Roe v. Wade the same or different?1 The Supreme Court
based both decisions on unenumerated constitutional rights: Lochner on liberty to contract, and
Roe on the right of privacy. While neither of these rights is expressly delineated in the
constitutional text, both the Lochner and Roe Courts tied the respective rights to due process.
Thus, these two landmark cases have been constantly linked for more than one-quarter century.
The Roe Court justices themselves worried about analogies to Lochner. And since Roe was
decided 1973, critics and defenders have been dancing a well-practiced minuet: critics charging
that Roe is Lochner all over again; defenders distinguishing the two cases, castigating Lochner
while celebrating Roe.
Most of the defenders and critics in this dance focus on the meaning of substantive due
process. Some critics of both Lochner and Roe insist that substantive due process is an
oxymoron. After all, the fifth and first amendments guarantee due “process,” not due substance.
Should not the right to due process guarantee that the government follow certain procedures in
appropriate circumstances, and nothing else, nothing substantive? Other critics, particularly of
Roe, construct a syllogistic argument supposedly based on history. During the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries, it is argued, the Court decided a series of cases, including Lochner,
that interpreted due process to encompass the substantive right of liberty to contract. In the
1930s, when the New Dealers started passing economic and social welfare legislation to shake
the nation from its Great Depression doldrums, the Court stubbornly continued to invalidate laws
that violated due process (or were otherwise beyond congressional power). President Franklin
Roosevelt responded with his court-packing plan, generating a constitutional crisis. Finally, in
1937, the Court capitulated with its “switch in time that saved nine,” repudiating Lochner and the
1

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522236
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substantive due process protection of liberty to contract.2 Yet, in Griswold v. Connecticut,
decided in 1965, and then in Roe, the Court resuscitated substantive due process and held that it
protected a right of privacy, encompassing a woman’s interest in choosing whether to have an
abortion. Thus, the syllogism: Lochner-era liberty to contract cases were grounded on
substantive due process; substantive due process was misguided; therefore, Lochner-era liberty
to contract cases were wrongly decided; finally, Roe-era right to privacy cases, also grounded on
substantive due process, must also be wrongly decided. In short, if liberty to contract is not
constitutionally protected, then the right privacy likewise should not be protected.3
Defenders of Roe, at this point, typically pirouette and argue that not all substantive due
process cases are alike. They underscore that, in the 1920s, the Court relied on its substantive
due process precedents to invalidate state laws restricting the autonomy or privacy of parents
deciding how to raise their children.4 In 1937, the defenders therefore argue, the Court did not
repudiate all substantive due process decisions, only those protecting economic rights,
particularly liberty to contract. The incipient right of privacy cases remained good law. Roe-era
2

Thomas Reed Powell first called the Court’s change the “switch in time that save nine.” Owen M. Fiss,
Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910, at 8 (1993). For a discussion of various arguments
concerning substantive due process, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const. Comment. 315, 315-19 (1999). Sources helpful in understanding the
Court’s jurisprudence of the 1930s include the following: Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The
Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1998); Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise
of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (1993); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law
1870-1960 (1992); Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties (2004); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme
Court Reborn (1995) [hereinafter Leuchtenburg, Reborn]; G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal
(2000); William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886-1937
(1998); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (1987); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,
92 Geo. L.J. 1 (2003); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971 (2000).
3

E.g., Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 116 (1990) (arguing that Roe should be “relegated to the
dustbin of history where Dred Scott and Lochner lie”); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 937-43 (1973) (arguing that Roe is the same as Lochner and should be overruled).
For a discussion of the various arguments concerning substantive due process, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const. Comment. 315, 315-19
(1999).
4

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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right of privacy cases do not manifest an atavistic and corrupt appearance of a repudiated
constitutional doctrine, but rather rely on a judicial awareness that not all substantive due process
cases are equivalent. The Court has correctly developed a nuanced understanding of liberty
under due process. Quite simply, then, the right of privacy is properly protected, while liberty to
contract is properly unprotected. Lochner and Roe are distinguishable.5
In this Article, I argue that this entire dance is out of beat with the historical music. The
analogical link between Lochner and Roe is ahistorical and misleading. The key to
understanding the relationship (or lack of relationship) between Lochner and Roe is not the
definition of substantive due process. In fact, no Supreme Court justice even used the phrase,
‘substantive due process’ until 1948, when Justice Wiley B. Rutledge used it in dissent.6 To
understand Lochner and Roe correctly, one must understand that each was decided under a
different democratic regime: Lochner under republican democracy, and Roe under pluralist
democracy. Because of the distinctive characteristics of republican and pluralist democracies,
the practices of judicial review starkly differed under each. Put in different words, Lochner and
Roe were decided within distinct paradigms of democracy and constitutional law, and as such,
the cases are largely incommensurable.7

5

E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 874-75 (1987) (distinguishing right of
privacy cases from Lochner-era liberty to contract cases).
6

Ely, supra note 2, at 319 (citing Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
7

My thesis builds on Howard Gillman’s reintrepration of the Lochner era. Gillman argues that the Supreme
Court justices of the Lochner era did not radically depart from previous constitutional decision making to decide in
accordance with their conservative political views. Rather, the justices continued to interpret the Constitution to
proscribe class legislation, a proscribtion with roots in the nineteenth century (and even earlier). Gillman, supra
note 2. David E. Bernstein criticizes Gillman for misconstruing many Lochner-era cases. Bernstein, supra note 2. I
find Gillman more persuasive than Bernstein, who seems to misunderstand the proscribtion on class legislation. In
particular, Bernstein does not give enough weight to the fact that legislatures could infringe on individual liberties to
promote the common good. See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare (1996) (discussing at length nineteenthcentury cases contrasting the common good and partial or private interests); White, supra note 2, at 246-51
(following Gillman’s approach).
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Part I of this Article describes republican democracy, republican democratic judicial
review, and the Lochner decision.8 Part II focuses on the development of pluralist democracy
and the problem of recasting judicial review under this new democratic regime.9 Part III focuses
on Roe as a definitive unenumerated rights case decided under pluralist democracy. Part IV, the
Conclusion, explains why Lochner and Roe should be analogized only with extreme caution—if
at all—and why such caution has rarely been exercised.10
I. Republican Democracy and Judicial Review
Republican democracy was grounded on three fundamental components. First, the
people were sovereign; government supposedly rested on the consent of the governed. Second,
the people as well as their elected officials were supposed to be imbued with civic virtue. Third,
because they were virtuous, the people and the governmental officials were supposed to pursue
the common good rather than “partial or private interests.”11 The government, in theory, was to
respect individual liberties but could always restrict them in pursuit of the common good.
During the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, innumerable legal disputes turned on
the distinction between the common good and partial or private interests, or as it was sometimes
phrased, the difference between reasonable and arbitrary (or class) legislation. Some judges,
seeking precision, would equate reasonableness with a means-ends nexus: the governmental
action must be a reasonable means for achieving the government’s purpose, which must
constitute the common good.12 For most judges, it should be added, the crucial distinction
8

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

9

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

10

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

11

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 59 (1969). The 1780
Massachusetts Constitution, for example, stated: “Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection,
safety, prosperity of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men.” Constitution of Massachusetts (1780), reprinted in 1 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters,
and other Organic Laws of the United States 956, 958 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878).
12

Justice Brown, for instance, wrote:
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between the categories of the common good, on the one hand, and partial or private interests, on
the other, was formalistic. The line between the opposed categories, that is, might initially be
obscure in any concrete dispute, but the demarcation was real and could be discerned through
careful analysis. The key, then, to the judicial analysis was the categorization of the
governmental purpose: was it for the common good or not? This analysis did not involve a
weighing or balancing of the government’s purpose or interest against countervailing interests;
the judicial conclusion supposedly rested on the proper understanding of preexisting categoryboundaries.13 Consequently, judges performed the task of “boundary pricking.”14 Courts needed
to place various legislative actions in either the public-good category or the private-interest
category. In doing so, the courts traced a boundary between the common good, on the one side,
and partial and private interests, on the other side, by pricking one point (or case) at a time.15
The result of this judicial boundary pricking was to sketch the contours of a protected private
realm of individual liberty and property. Given the nature of republican democracy, however,
the courts did not focus so much on the definition of individual rights and liberties as on the
legislatures’ actions and purposes. In each case, the question became whether the legislature, in
the eyes of the court, had acted for the common good? If the legislature had acted for the
To justify the state in … interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear—First, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
13

Gillman, supra note 2, at 54-55; G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's
Lochner Dissent, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 87, 114-17 (1997).
14

15

“Boundary pricking” is G. Edward White’s felicitous phrase. White, supra note 2, at 36.

“Boundary pricking, which consisted of a process by which new cases were placed in one or another
essentialist category, and consequently in one sphere of authority or another, was the essence of guardian judicial
review in constitutional law.” Id.; see Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the
Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 787, 806-09 (1999) (emphasizing how the courts
separated law from politics to help justify judicial review).
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common good, then the court would uphold the government’s action. If the legislature had
instead acted for the benefit of private or partial interests, then the court would invalidate the
government’s action. In the words of Chancellor James Kent, “private interest must be made
subservient to the general interest of the community.”16
The preeminent constitutional-law treatise of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries was Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, first published in 1868 and, by 1903,
in a seventh edition.17 Cooley’s elucidation of the judicial enforcement of constitutional limits
relied heavily on republican democratic principles. Cooley began by declaring that the people
are sovereign: “The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the
people, from whom springs all legitimate authority.”18 Cooley then explained how the
requirement that legislation be for the common good both empowered and limited the
government. According to Cooley, the government always retained the legislative power to
enact any laws for the common good. When discussing the definition of due process or the law
of the land, Cooley quoted approvingly from Daniel Webster: “‘The meaning is, that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of general rules
which govern society.’”19 Cooley observed that under the state police power “persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.”20 Indeed, at one point, Cooley stated that the
16

James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 276 (1827; Legal Classics Library Reprint).

17

Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power
of the States of the American Union (Da Capo Press ed. 1972) (reprint of 1st ed. 1868); Eben Moglen, Holmes’s
Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 2027, 2033 (1995).
18

Cooley, supra note 17, at 28.

19

Id. at 353-54 (quoting Daniel Webster).

20

Id. at 573-74. Therefore, Cooley added:

All contracts and all rights, it is held, are subject to this [police] power; and regulations which affect them
may not only be established by the State, but must also be subject to change from time to time, with
reference to the general well-being of the community, as circumstances change, or as experience
demonstrates the necessity.
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legislative power “must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to
natural justice or not.”21 Not coincidentally, then, Cooley did not encourage judicial activism.
Courts are not superior to legislatures, he reasoned, and therefore the courts’ power of judicial
review over legislative acts should only “be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation.”22
Even so, Cooley emphasized that the requirement that legislation be for the common
good constrained the government; after all, the title of his treatise was Constitutional Limitations.
It is “the very nature of free government,” he wrote, for the legislature “to make laws for the
public good, and not for the benefit of individuals.”23 Consequently, “[t]he bills of rights in the
American constitutions forbid that parties shall be deprived of property except by the law of the
land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one man’s property
over to another would nevertheless be void.”24 More generally, Cooley explained, legislatures
are restrained from enacting laws for partial or private interests.
[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special
statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that which
is applied in all similar cases would not be legitimate legislation, but an arbitrary
mandate, unrecognized in free government. Mr. Locke has said of those who make the

Id. at 574.
21

Id. at 168. The surrounding passage is worth noting:

The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has imposed limits upon
the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural
justice or not in any particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the
State, unless those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial
cognizance.
Id.
22

Id. at 160. “[I]t is only where [the courts] find that the legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action.” Id. at 160.
23

Id. at 129 (emphasis added).

24

Id. at 175.
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laws: ‘They are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman
at plough’; and this may be justly said to have become a maxim in the law, by which may
be tested the authority and binding force of legislative enactments.25
This limit on legislative power translated into a demand for equality under the law: “Special
privileges are obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes are still more so.”26
The influence of Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, in one edition after another,
underscores the continuing importance of republican democratic principles. Yet,
industrialization, immigration, and urbanization placed republican democracy under enormous
pressures in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The meaning of the common good
was constantly contested and subject to change.27 During this time, the economic ideology of
laissez faire became increasingly influential and thus shaped judges’ interpretations of the
common good. Many judicial decisions seemed to shift the border between public goods and
partial or private interests so as to expand the private realm of protected economic interests
(despite the fact that, in theory, the category-boundaries were preexisting).

25

Id. at 391-92.

26

Id. at 393. In a case decided in 1870, Judge Cooley elaborated the nexus between equality and the
prohibition against partial or private legislation.
But the discrimination by the State between different classes of occupations, and the favoring of one at the
expense of the rest, whether that one be farming or banking, merchandising or milling, printing or
railroading, is not legitimate legislation, and is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a
maxim in State government. When the door is once opened to it, there is no line at which we can stop and
say with confidence that thus far we may go with safety and propriety, but no further. Every honest
employment is honorable, it is beneficial to the public; it deserves encouragement. The more successful we
can make it, the more does it generally subserve the public good. But it is not the business of the State to
make discriminations in favor of one class against another, or in favor of one employment against another.
The State can have no favorites. Its business is to protect the industry of all, and to give all the benefit of
equal laws.
People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
27

See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United
States 18-21 (1992) (discussing contested nineteenth-century meanings of republicanism).
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Two Supreme Court decisions would, for future generations, epitomize this era: Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, decided in 1897, and Lochner v. New York, decided in 1905. In holding that a state
restriction on insurance contracts violated due process, the Allgeyer Court solidified the laissezfaire flavored transformation of free labor into “liberty to contract.”28 The ideology of free labor,
originating during the mid-nineteenth-century in opposition to slave labor, had provided a
rallying cry for Abraham Lincoln’s Republican Party before, during, and after the Civil War.
Justice Rufus Peckham’s unanimous Allgeyer opinion acknowledged the “right of the state to
enact … legislation in the legitimate exercise of its police or other powers as to it may seem
proper.”29 But such exercises of the police power, the Court stressed, must be consistent with the
individual rights and liberties protected by a republican democratic form of government. In
particular, Peckham emphasized:
The ‘liberty’ mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means, not only the right of the
citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but
the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan, Peckham explicitly linked liberty to contract with
republican democratic equality: the individual should enjoy “‘upon terms of equality with all
others in similar circumstances … the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of
acquiring, holding, and selling property.’”30 Finally, it should be noted, liberty to contract was

28

165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); see Bernstein, supra note 2, at 43 (discussing how Court continued to invoke
“liberty of contract” language).
29

165 U.S. at 591.

30

Id. at 589-90 (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888)).
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not expressly enumerated in the constitutional text, though it was tied to the enumerated right of
due process.
Interestingly, during this Supreme Court era, the Court itself would cite Allgeyer far more
often than it would cite the more renowned (or infamous) Lochner. 31 Regardless, Lochner itself
perfectly exemplifies the nature and difficulty of judicial review under republican democracy in
this time of political strain. The case arose from a due process challenge to a state law that
restricted the number of hours employees could work in bakeries (ten per day and sixty per
week). In a five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated the law. Peckham’s majority opinion
began by acknowledging that the state could exercise its police power to regulate for “the safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of the public.”32 Moreover, Peckham added, “[b]oth property
liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed [pursuant to the police
power].”33 Yet, simultaneously, the fourteenth amendment prescribed “a limit to the valid
exercise of the police power by the state.”34 The state cannot infringe on individual rights and
liberties under the “mere pretext” of exercising its police powers for the common good.35 Thus,
the Court framed the issue: “Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right
of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?”36

31

Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought From Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual
Voyage 104 (2000).
32

198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).

33

Id.

34

Id. at 56.

35

Id.

36

Id.
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Put in different words, could the law be justified as pursuing the common good, or was it
merely favoring partial or private interests? The Court considered two alternative justifications
for the statute: as a regulation of labor relations, and as a regulation for health purposes. Given
that bakers were equal “in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual
occupations,” Peckham readily concluded that the statute, if viewed as “a purely labor law,” did
not promote the common good. “[A] law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the
morals, nor the welfare, of the public, and … the interest of the public is not in the slightest
degree affected by such an act.”37 Hence, if the law were to be upheld, it must be as a health
regulation. But, Peckham reasoned, “there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker, in and
of itself, is not an unhealthy one to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere
with the right to labor.”38 Indeed, Peckham suspected that the New York legislature, similar to
the legislatures of other states passing social welfare laws, had been disingenuous in its
expression of purpose.39 And when focused on the true legislative purpose, the Court saw the
statute for what it was, impermissible class legislation. “It seems to us that the real object and
purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employees (all
being men, sui juris), in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real
and substantial degree to the health of the employees.”40
The dissenters agreed with the majority on the need to apply the fundamental principles
of republican democracy. Disagreement arose over the application of those principles in this
particular case. Harlan’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices William R. Day and Edward D.
White, began by focusing on the interplay between the state’s police power and individual rights
37

Id. at 57.

38

Id. at 59.

39

Id. at 63-64.

40

Id. at 64. Compare Gillman, supra note 2, at 127-29 (arguing that Lochner majority found the law to be
impermissible class legislation) and White, supra note 2, at 246-51 (analyzing Lochner consistently with Gillman’s
approach) with Bernstein, supra note 2, at 23-26 (criticizing Gillman’s argument).
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and liberties: “liberty of contract [like other rights and liberties] is subject to such regulations as
the state may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the well-being of society.”41 But
was a restriction on bakers’ hours of employment in the common good? Harlan reviewed the
evidence concerning the health of bakers and concluded that “there is room for debate and for an
honest difference of opinion.”42 Unlike the majority, however, Harlan refused to presume that
the legislature had been disingenuous; instead, given the uncertain connection between bakers’
hours and their health, Harlan deferred to the legislative judgment. “We are not to presume that
the state of New York has acted in bad faith. Nor can we assume that its legislature acted
without due deliberation, or that it did not determine this question upon the fullest attainable
information and for the common good.”43 Arguing similarly, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., also dissented. Quite simply, the Court should have deferred to the legislative judgment
because “[a] reasonable man might think [the disputed statute] a proper measure on the score of
health.”44 Moreover, Holmes added, the majority’s demarcation between the common good and
private or partial interests seemed to be unduly influenced by Social Darwinist or laissez-faire

41

198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan wrote:

I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within certain limits, be
subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general welfare, or to guard the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety. “The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States
to every person within its jurisdiction does not import,” this court has recently said, “an absolute right in
each person to be at all times and in all circumstances wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”
Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 26 (1905)).
42

Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

43

Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). “Our duty, I submit, is to sustain the statute as not being in conflict with
the Federal Constitution, for the reason—and such is an all-sufficient reason—it is not shown to be plainly and
palpably inconsistent with that instrument.” Id.
44

Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes added: “Men whom I certainly could not pronounce
unreasonable would uphold it as a first instalment of a general regulation of the hours of work. Whether in the latter
aspect it would be open to the charge of inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss.” Id.
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ideology. In Holmes’s terse prose, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics.”45
II. Pluralist Democracy and the Problem of Judicial Review
During the 1920s and 1930s, numerous political, social, and cultural factors led to the
downfall of republican democratic government. In its stead, by the early- to mid-1930s, the
practice of pluralist democracy had taken hold. A full exploration of this transition is beyond the
scope of this Article, but in short, republican democracy, originally built on agrarian economics,
widespread land-ownership, and Protestant values, no longer fit the urban, industrial, and
culturally diverse America that consolidated between the World Wars.46 The new regime—
pluralist democracy—was marked by a widespread opportunity to participate in politics. One
did not need to qualify to participate by demonstrating civic virtue. In particular, during the
thirties, many ethnic and immigrant urbanites who had previously been discouraged from
participating in national politics became voters, supporting the New Deal. Moreover, pluralist
democracy acknowledged that politics was about the pursuit of self-interest. Legislatures no
longer supposedly pursued the common good. Instead, legislators responded to the requests,
demands, and blandishments of interest groups. Legislation arose from interest-group battles and
compromises. Thus, for example, legislation favoring labor unions was no longer condemned as
class legislation, favoring partial or private interests. To be sure, labor constituted an interest
group, but now, so did management; all societal groups concerned about politics were
understood to be interest groups. Pursuing self-interest became normal and legitimate.

45

Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes elaborated: “[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez
faire.” Id.
46

See Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940, at 58 (1989) (explaining
divisions within American society); William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 332 (1963)
(emphasizing the participation of former political outsiders in the New Deal coalition); Robert S. McElvaine, The
Great Depression 197-98 (1984) (discussing changing values in America).
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While the practice of pluralist democracy had become entrenched by the mid-1930s, two
important institutions still needed to adjust to the transition: the academy (particularly in law
and political science), and the courts (especially the Supreme Court). By the mid- to late-1930s,
academics and other intellectuals already were struggling to explain and legitimate the new
democratic practices. By the early 1950s, the contours of a new theory of democracy—a theory
of pluralist democracy—had already been developed. Eventually, the political scientist Robert
A. Dahl would articulate the theory of pluralist democracy more comprehensively perhaps than
any other scholar. Writing in 1956, Dahl explained that pluralist democracy, like republican
democracy, rested on “popular sovereignty.” Yet, contrary to a republican democratic approach,
Dahl acknowledged the primacy of self-interest: “If unrestrained by external checks, any given
individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over others.” Thus, a democratic theory must
encompass “processes” that effectuate legitimate interests while simultaneously controlling
illegitimate interests. Legitimacy and illegitimacy, moreover, must be determined through the
processes themselves. Dahl thus identified eight processes that were conditions or prerequisites
for the operation of a democracy. For instance, in an election, the weight of each individual’s
vote is “identical;” a candidate or policy alternative “with the greatest number of votes is
declared the winning choice;” and “orders of elected officials [shall be] executed.” Dahl
admitted that “no human organization … has ever met or is ever likely to meet [all] eight
conditions.” Yet, some organizations, called “polyarchies,” came close; he included the United
States in this group. Finally, Dahl maintained that American culture nurtured a needed
consensus regarding democratic processes. Individuals and interest groups might clash in
political struggles, but they shared certain elementary cultural norms that prevented the society
from splintering into embittered fragments. “To assume that this country has remained
democratic because of its Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation,” Dahl
wrote, “it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our
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society is essentially democratic.” And our democratic culture encouraged self-interested
individuals to bargain and generally to accept moderate compromises.47
Subsequently, Dahl elaborated his democratic theory, which was unequivocally pluralist.
“[T]he ancient belief,” he explained “that citizens both could and should pursue the public good
rather than their private ends became more difficult to sustain, and even impossible, as ‘the
public good’ fragmented into individual and group interests.” Dahl continued to emphasize
popular sovereignty and process. “Democracy means, literally, rule by the people. … In order to
rule, the people must have some way of ruling, a process for ruling.” Thus, Dahl arrived at his
central question: “What are the distinctive characteristics of a democratic process of
government?” He specified five criteria that a “perfect democratic government” would satisfy.
The first and foremost criterion or condition for democracy is “effective participation.”
“Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome,”
Dahl wrote. “They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the
agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.”48
Put in different words, as Dahl explained, a right to self-government is a “general moral
right”—“one of the most fundamental rights a person can possess”—which “translates into an
array of moral and legal rights, many of which are specific and legally enforceable.” That is, the
five criteria requisite to democracy require that participants possess certain enforceable rights,
such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press. “[I]f the rights are absent, … the
democratic process does not exist.” Well, then, Dahl asked, what happens “if a majority acting
by perfectly democratic procedures deprives a minority of its freedom of speech?” Dahl’s
answer: it’s impossible. “[I]n such a case the majority would not—could not—be acting by
‘perfectly democratic procedures’ [because these specific rights, like free speech] are integral to
47
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the democratic process.” Although pluralist democratic theory focuses on process, the process
requires the protection of certain substantive rights. Otherwise, individuals would be unable “to
participate fully, as equal citizens, in the making of all the collective decisions by which they are
bound.” Dahl concluded, therefore, that democracy has limits “built into the very nature of the
process itself. If you exceed those limits, then you necessarily violate the democratic process.”
Finally, Dahl returned to his emphasis on democratic culture. If a majority is bent on infringing
the rights of a minority, Dahl admitted, the logic of the democratic process might not protect the
minority. “In practice … the democratic process isn’t likely to be preserved for very long unless
the people of a country preponderantly believe that it’s desirable and unless their belief comes to
be embedded in their habits, practices, and culture.” Without a supportive culture, courts and
other governmental institutions will not be able to preserve democratic processes.49
With regard to the judiciary vis-à-vis the emergence of pluralist democracy, the Court’s
continued application in most scenarios of republican democratic principles lasted not only
through the 1920s but also into the 1930s. The reasons for the persistence of republican
democratic judicial review were threefold. First, while the practice of pluralist democracy began
to emerge during the early 1930s, the theory did not crystallize until later in the decade. Living
through the transformation of democracy, many observers did not immediately recognize or
grasp the ramifications of the transition. Second, the institutional practice of adjudication, with
its emphasis on stare decisis, has a natural reliance on the past, on tradition, on precedents. As
such, one would expect the judiciary often to lag behind other institutions when change is afoot.
Third, and related to the previous point, federal judges (including Supreme Court justices)
receive lifetime appointments. In a time of critical transition, such as the 1930s, many judges
would have nonetheless matured, learned their professional norms, and been appointed to the
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federal bench during the prior democratic regime. Such judges would be apt to continue
applying the principles and doctrines that they had become accustomed to earlier in their careers.
Thus, as had been true during the pre-World War I era, the Supreme Court continued to
resolve numerous challenges to governmental actions by determining whether the action was
either for the common good or for partial or private interests. For instance, in Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, decided in 1923, the Court held that a District of Columbia law setting
minimum wages for women and children violated due process. The Court identified several
types of cases where it had previously found statutes promoting the common good or public
welfare, but also emphasized that due process protected freedom of contract, including for
employment contracts. The majority opinion bolstered this latter point by citing a long string of
precedents, including Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v. New York. Then, examining the
disputed statute setting minimum wages for employees, the Court reasoned that it favored partial
or private interests: “The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract.
It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum.”
In other words, the statute amounted to impermissible class legislation, “a naked, arbitrary
exercise of power that … cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of the United
States.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in
innocent matters, is not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good.” Yet, while the
Court must give “great weight” to legislative assertions of the common good, the justices cannot
accept such a legislative statement if it appears to be “a mere pretext.” Holmes dissented,
reasoning that when the common good or public welfare is unclear, as in this case, the Court
should uphold the legislative determination so long as it was reasonable. But the majority found
instead that it’s “plain duty” was to invalidate this law; doing so was necessary to promote the
common good. “To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution is
not to strike down the common good, but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole
cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its
constituent members.” To be sure, such judicial determinations of the common good varied with
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the facts of each case. One year later, for example, in Radice v. New York, the Court held that a
state law restricting the hours of employment for women in restaurants did not constitute
impermissible class legislation. The legislature justifiably concluded that the law would
“preserve and promote the public health and welfare.”50
A. Crisis and Change
The Court’s application of the principles of republican democratic judicial review
became more problematic when FDR and Congress began to implement the New Deal agenda.
The national and state governments’ efforts to boost the country out of the Depression by
regulating the economy and society to an unprecedented degree inevitably clashed with the
Court’s traditional methods of judicial review. To be sure, the Court occasionally upheld
legislation it found to promote the common good, and even hinted that it might respond
favorably to the pull of pluralist democracy. In 1934, in Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes’s majority opinion explained that the societal changes
engendered by industrialization had produced “a growing appreciation of public needs.”
Similarly, that same year, Justice Owen J. Roberts’s majority opinion in Nebbia v. New York,
upholding state regulations of milk prices, reasoned that the “category of businesses affected
with a public interest” was flexible and expandable. Both these cases suggested that the Court
might be ready to enlarge the republican democratic common good to such a degree that the
concept would become meaningless; any interests or values could, in theory, be deemed
equivalent to the common good.51 Moreover, some justices elsewhere further signaled that they
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were ready to turn the Court. Harlan F. Stone, in the early 1920s, while still Dean of Columbia
Law School, expressed reservations about sociological jurisprudence. He worried that a judicial
assessment of social interests would be lacking in methodology and thus lead to unprincipled
decision making. Yet, in a 1936 address at Harvard Law School, now-Justice Stone advocated
for a type of “judicial lawmaking” that, while ambiguous, suggested an openness to pluralist
democratic processes. Emphasizing the common law, Stone denounced “mechanical” reliance
on precedents that reduced the law to “a dry and sterile formalism.” Instead, a judge should
recognize that sometimes “he performs essentially the function of the legislator, and in a real
sense makes law.” In doing so, the judge should appraise and compare “social values,” or in
other words, assess “relative weights of the social and economic advantages … of one rule rather
than another.” Thus, just as pluralist democracy was becoming entrenched in actual political
practices, Stone was arguing that not only should legislators weigh competing interests and
values, but that judges should do so as well. Indeed, though focused on the common law, Stone
extended his comments to constitutional law, where “more often than in private law, [the issue]
is between the conflicting interests of the individual and of society as a whole.”52
Nonetheless, in 1935, the Court’s hinted readiness to embrace pluralist democracy
seemed to vanish, like a will-o’-the-wisp. Both Blaisdell and Nebbia were close five-to-four
decisions, with the same four conservative dissenters, sometimes disparaged as the “Four
Horsemen”: James C. McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler.
Moreover, despite Roberts’s Nebbia opinion, he generally adhered to republican democratic
principles and often proved to be the swing vote in close cases, frequently joining the Four
Horsemen though occasionally voting with the more progressive-liberal justices, Stone,
Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis D. Brandeis—and quite often, Hughes, who was perhaps more of
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a centrist, like Roberts. Then, in a spate of 1935- and 1936- cases invalidating key New Deal
statutes, as well as a number of cases involving state social welfare enactments, Roberts
repeatedly joined the conservatives. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company
struck down the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as being beyond Congress’s power under the
commerce clause. Reasoning that the statute contravened the common good, the Court
categorized it as class legislation: “an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat
noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer and employee, not as a rule or regulation
of commerce and transportation between the states, but as a means of assuring a particular class
of employees against old age dependency.” As such, the legislation did not foster “the railroads’
duty to serve the public [good or interest] in interstate transportation.” Furthering only “the
social welfare of the worker,” the Act constituted an impermissible regulation of commerce.53 In
short order, the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act, and provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In Carter v. Carter Coal
Company, the Court clarified that acting for the common good was a necessary but not sufficient
condition for establishing the constitutionality of congressional legislation. Not only must a
statute be for the common good, but Congress must also act pursuant to one of its specifically
enumerated powers. And the Court consistently resolved such issues of congressional power in
accordance with a formal conceptualism similar to that used to determine whether a
governmental action furthered only partial or private interests. For instance, in Carter Coal, the
Court distinguished national and local activities as if they were preexisting a priori categories.
Reasoning that mining, like manufacturing, growing crops, and other types of production, was “a
purely local activity,” the Court concluded that Congress’s attempt to regulate bituminous coal
mining exceeded its constitutional powers.54
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Even Stone and the other progressive-liberal justices most often analyzed cases in accord
with the traditional structures of republican democratic judicial review. True, Stone’s Harvard
address had suggested he might be ready to move to a form of judicial review more consistent
with pluralist democracy, but much of that ambiguous address had been more consistent with
sociological jurisprudence—and hence republican democracy—than with the newer legal realist
jurisprudence—which hewed more closely to the emerging pluralist democracy. Stone cited the
renowned Roscoe Pound as well as other sociological jurisprudents but did not cite a single
leading realist author. More important, after suggesting that courts might need to weigh
individual interests against societal interests to resolve constitutional issues, Stone retreated to
republican democratic rhetoric by noting the “incalculable social worth” of individual rights. In
other words, individual liberty was meaningful, it seemed, only insofar as it contributed to a
common good: “Just where the line is to be drawn which marks the boundary between the
appropriate field of individual liberty and right and that of government action for the larger good,
so as to insure the least sacrifice of both types of social advantage, is the perpetual question of
constitutional law.”55 Thus, unsurprisingly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United
States, the sick chicken case, Stone joined all of the other justices in unanimously invalidating
the National Industrial Recovery Act; Hughes’s opinion reasoned in part that Congress had
exceeded its power. In United States v. Butler, Stone’s dissenting opinion, joined by Brandeis
and Cardozo, criticized the majority for invalidating Agricultural Adjustment Act provisions that
promoted the “general welfare” and fulfilled a “public purpose.” In Alton Railroad, Hughes
wrote a dissenting and concurring opinion, joined by Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone. Concluding
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contrary to the majority (the Four Horsemen plus Roberts) that one of the disputed sections of
the Railroad Retirement Act should be upheld, Hughes reasoned that the provision did not
constitute impermissible class legislation because it promoted the common good, even if it also
imposed “unequal burdens” on railroads. These same justices, in fact, concurred with the
majority’s conclusion that another statutory section was beyond congressional power, though the
liberals believed the invalid section could be severed from the rest of the statute, thus preserving
the gist of the congressional program.56
The Court’s adherence to republican democratic principles provoked the ire of many
intellectuals. Robert Hale, a political scientist associated with the legal realist movement, and
Morris Cohen, a legal philosopher, each published articles in the mid-1930s exemplifying these
critiques. As described by Cohen, the Court subscribed to a “cult of freedom.” From the
justices’ perspective, “an ideally desirable system of law” would recognize legal obligations as
arising “only out of the will of the individual contracting freely.” Any restraint on such freedom
would necessarily be detrimental. Both Cohen and Hale criticized this vision of an ideal legal
system in three ways. First, one party to a contract typically lacks true freedom, especially in the
employment context. While the Supreme Court rhapsodized about the public value of liberty to
contract, most employees either accepted the employer’s offer or starved. As Hale elaborated,
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private entities (individuals or corporations) often exert coercive power over other individuals
who, lacking reasonable alternatives, are forced to accept inequitable contracts. The justices’
laissez-faire-inspired interpretation of the common good, in which the absence of governmental
regulation supposedly maximized individual liberty, contravened social reality. Second, Cohen
and Hale questioned the justices’ republican democratic assumption that there existed a private
sphere of individual freedom distinct from a public sphere of governmental action, with the
border between the spheres demarcated by the the common good. Cohen and Hale argued that
duties and obligations in the so-called private realm exist only because of governmental support;
property and contract rights arise and are enforceable only if the courts recognize and sanction
them. In Hale’s words, governmental officials, including judges, effectively carry “out the
mandates of property owners.” Third, and following from their first two arguments, both Cohen
and Hale suggested that the Court should modify its approach to judicial review in accordance
with the realities of democracy—that is, in accordance with the emergent pluralist democracy.
Cohen explained that Americans had never strictly followed the “cult of freedom.” Even those
who celebrated it in the 1930s still sought governmental assistance for their own businesses. The
true question, Cohen declared, was not how to minimize governmental interference in some
ostensibly private sphere of freedom; rather the question was what interests should be protected
and who should control the government. In a similar vein, Hale maintained that when Congress
enacted economic or social welfare legislation, it did not infringe liberty. Instead, Congress
chose among the competing interests of different individuals and groups.57
Other realists denounced the Lochner-era justices for their ostensible reliance on formal
doctrinal categories. The justices wrote opinions suggesting that these doctrinal categories,
including the distinction between the common good and partial or private interests, mandated the
57
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case outcomes. The justices claimed, in short, to decide in accordance with the rule of law. But
from the realist perspective, judges were no more rational than were other humans. They were
subject to the same irrational impulses and displayed the same idiosyncratic behaviors. Thurman
Arnold explained that the legal system, like other human institutions, embodied “all sorts of
contradictory ideals going in different directions.” Therefore, judges and legal scholars
constituted, in effect, “a priesthood devoted to the task of proving that which is necessarily
false”—that the legal system was rational and coherent and that judicial disputes were decided
pursuant to legal rules. Judicial opinions and jurisprudential theories aimed “to make rational in
appearance the operation of an institution which is actually mystical and dramatic.” To Arnold,
the absurd theater of the legal system stood out in stark relief as soon as one contemplated the
adversary system, where partisan opponents engaged in a bitter “trial by combat” that was
bizarrely “supposed to bring out the truth.”58
While intellectuals like Arnold and Hale constructed complex theoretical arguments,
other critics were more decidedly political. And once the Court began bulldozing the New Deal
in 1935 and 1936, such critics intensified their harangues of the justices. After Butler invalidated
Agricultural Adjustment Act provisions, the New York Times reported that Iowa State students
hung the six majority justices in effigy. A standard critique became that the justices were a
group of crotchety old men out-of-step with modern times; one newspaper called them “nine old
back-number owls (appointed by by-gone Presidents) who sit on the leafless, fruitless limb of an
old dead tree.” Among the Four Horsemen, in particular, Van Devanter had been appointed in
1910, McReynolds in 1914, and Sutherland and Butler in 1922. Only McReynolds had not been
a Republican appointee; Wilson had nominated him. In a bestselling 1936 book, Drew Pearson
and Robert S. Allen denounced the justices as “Nine Old Men” who refused “to take cognizance
of the speed of modern civilization in industrial and economic development, and [denied]
posterity the right to express itself in regard to social and economic reform in its own way.” The
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problem, that is, was not that the justices were acting politically, but rather that their politics
contravened the desires of a vast American majority. And the 1936 election seemed to prove the
validity of this critique. FDR received close to twenty-eight million popular votes compared
with Alf Landon’s total of less than seventeen million.59
In the wake of his landslide victory, Roosevelt pressed for change. If the Court, as an
institution, insisted on politically opposing the New Deal, Roosevelt would change its politics.
He could not force the Four Horsemen to retire and to open spots for new appointees, so he
decided to ask Congress to add new positions to the Court. Roosevelt would then be able to
appoint New Deal supporters to counterbalance the Four Horsemen. FDR, to be clear, did not
hatch his so-called court-packing plan on his own. Congress had previously enacted legislation
to restrict federal court jurisdiction in response to judicial decisions interfering with
congressional objectives. And Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Homer S. Cummings, had
developed the idea that a statute, rather than a constitutional amendment, might be the best way
to alter the makeup and politics of the Court.60 Regardless of its sources, on February 5, 1937,
Roosevelt revealed his proposal in a message to the Senate. Early the next month, on March 9,
Roosevelt pleaded his case for reform to the American people in one of his radio Fireside Chats.
He lamented that “chance and the disinclination of individuals to leave the Supreme bench have
now given us a Court in which five Justices will be over seventy-five years of age before next
June and one over seventy.” These justices had created a “crisis” by casting “doubts on the
ability of the elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern
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social and economic conditions.” Roosevelt thus sketched the following proposal: “Whenever a
Judge or Justice of any Federal Court has reached the age of seventy and does not avail himself
of the opportunity to retire on a pension, a new member shall be appointed by the President then
in office, with the approval, as required by the Constitution, of the Senate of the United States.”
The Court, under this proposed legislation, could have anywhere between a minimum of nine
and a maximum of fifteen justices. If implemented, this plan would render judicial decision
making “speedier and therefore less costly” and would “bring to the decision of social and
economic problems younger men who have had personal experience and contact with modern
facts and circumstances.”61
FDR’s court-packing plan sparked immediate controversy. Even many of Roosevelt’s
congressional supporters questioned the wisdom of the proposal, which they claimed would
unduly skew the balance of power among the three national branches, endanger individual
liberties, and diminish state sovereignty. Nonetheless, while Congress debated the court-packing
plan, its fate still uncertain, the Supreme Court announced two decisions—West Coast Hotel
Company v. Parrish, and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation—that revealed a new
willingness to uphold economic and social welfare statutes. For the most part, Roberts was
responsible for the so-called “switch in time that saved nine” because he abandoned the Four
Horsemen and began to vote consistently with the more liberal justices. Yet, these two 1937
decisions not only had enormous political ramifications—because of Roberts’s switch—but also
marked the Court’s acceptance of the new regime of pluralist democracy. In the words of Yale
law professor Eugene V. Rostow, the Court “died and was reborn in 1937.”62
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West Coast Hotel, decided March 29, arose from a challenge to a state law setting
minimum wages for women. The employer argued Adkins had already established that such a
statute violated freedom of contract as protected by due process. The West Coast Hotel
dissenters—the Four Horsemen—in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, agreed. They
concluded that this minimum wage law, applicable only to women, constituted “arbitrary” class
legislation. “There is no longer any reason why [women] should be put in different classes in
respect of their legal right to make contracts; nor should they be denied, in effect, the right to
compete with men for work paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept.”63 The
five-justice majority, with an opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes, overruled Adkins and
upheld the law. Much of the opinion invoked concepts familiar from earlier cases, concepts
echoing republican democratic government. The Court referred to the common good with
various iterations, explaining that liberty can be restrained to promote “the health, safety, morals,
and welfare of the people” and that, more specifically, freedom of contract could be infringed “in
the public interest.” Yet, near the end of the opinion, Hughes appeared to accept the realistinspired criticisms of the formalist distinction between public and private spheres.
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to
bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is
not only detrimental to their health and well being, but casts a direct burden for their
support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. We may take judicial notice of the
unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent period of depression and
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still continue to an alarming extent despite the degree of economic recovery which has
been achieved. … The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for
unconscionable employers.64
In this passage, Hughes reasoned that, without statutory regulation, the operation of the
economic marketplace did not maximize employees’ liberty. To the contrary, employers
exploited workers by coercing them to work for unreasonable wages. Moreover, if the
government did not act to correct these inequities, it would, in effect, be subsidizing employers
because it would no longer allow indigents to starve. If employers refused to pay a living wage,
the government would need to provide relief. By questioning the separateness of the public and
private spheres, Hughes implicitly doubted the republican democratic conceptual distinction
between a common good and partial or private interests. The Court might still be using terms
resonant with earlier cases decided under republican democracy, but such terms, such as “the
public interest,” now apparently meant something different. Thus, the majority refused to
invalidate the law as class legislation, even though it extended protection only to women and not
to men. Instead, the justices emphasized that the legislature can choose the manner and the
degree to which it responds to social problems.65
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, decided two weeks later, erased
remaining doubts about whether the Court had truly changed its approach to judicial review.
Again, in a five-to-four decision, with the same majority and dissenters, the Court upheld
legislation that likely would have been invalidated under the strictures of republican democratic
judicial review. Significantly, this legislation was not only federal, it was the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), the statute that ushered in an era of dramatically expanding union rolls
and nurtured the transformation of ethnic political outsiders into active voting citizens. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had found that Jones and Laughlin had engaged in
64
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statutorily proscribed unfair labor practices. Jones and Laughlin responded by arguing, among
other things, that Congress had exceeded its power by passing the NLRA. In sustaining the law,
the Court articulated two points crucial to the transition to pluralist democracy. First, the Court
refused to restrict Congress’s commerce power by reference to formal doctrinal categories.
Jones and Laughlin argued that manufacturing was, by definition, a form of production rather
than a type of interstate commerce and, therefore, beyond congressional control. In the past,
such ostensibly non-commercial activities could be regulated only if they could be categorized as
an “essential part” of “a ‘stream’ or ‘flow’ of commerce.” In this case, though, the justices
repudiated such formal categories as limits on Congress. Likewise, when Jones and Laughlin
argued that the regulated activities had only an indirect rather than direct effect on interstate
commerce—a categorization that previously would have judicially doomed legislation—the
Court declared: “We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to
deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.” Instead of
resolving the case in such a vacuum, pursuant to formal categories like direct and indirect, the
justices insisted that it must understand interstate commerce as a “practical conception.” And
whether particular activities bore a sufficiently “close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce” to justify legislative regulation was now, according to the Court, “primarily for
Congress to consider and decide.”66
Second, the Court refused to classify employees or labor unions as illegitimate factions
who could not pursue their interests in the political process. In the past, the Court had
consistently deemed any statute that benefited unions to be impermissible class legislation
furthering a partial or private interest rather than the common good. Labor relations therefore
had largely been governed by the common law, which had typically been interpreted favorably to
employers.67 Meanwhile, courts had consistently concluded that statutes promoting business or
66
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commerce promoted the common good. In other words, pro-business legislation manifested a
virtuous pursuit of the public interest, while pro-labor legislation manifested a corrupt pursuit of
partial interests. Now, the justices abjured such a distinction between employers and employees.
“Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes
as the [manufacturer-employer] has to organize its business and select its own officers and
agents.” Employees and employers stood on equal footing: each group had its respective
interests and values. True, a manufacturer has a “right to conduct its business in an orderly
manner,” but employees also have a “correlative right to organize for the purpose of securing the
redress of grievances and to promote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and
conditions of work.” Indeed, the Court explained that even if the legislation were “one-sided”—
subjecting “the employer to supervision and restraint” while leaving “untouched the abuses for
which employees may be responsible”—the statute would still be constitutional. As a matter of
policy, Congress could choose which “evils” it would seek to remedy and in what manner it
would do so.68
After this case, the traditional structure of republican democratic judicial review was
defunct. If all legislation were a product of competing interests, pressed by opposed groups, then
the courts could no longer invalidate a statute as class legislation promoting partial or private
interests. The Court might still explain that a particular statute furthered the general welfare, the
public interest, or the common good, but these terms had different connotations under the new
pluralist democratic regime. Insofar as there was a common good under pluralist democracy, it
was no more than an aggregation of private interests and values; the common good no longer
signified the virtuous transcendence of self-interest. Congress, at its discretion, could
legitimately and openly act in response to the entreaties of the most powerful or persuasive
interest groups.69
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The Court’s commitment to a form of judicial review consistent with pluralist democracy
was nowhere clearer than in Wickard v. Filburn, decided in 1942. Filburn challenged the
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which subjected his production of
wheat to regulation even if raised “wholly for consumption on [his] farm.” In upholding the
congressional action, a unanimous Court emphasized three points. First, it would not rely on
formalist categories to restrict congressional power. “[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are
not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to
nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects
of the activity in question upon interstate commerce.” Second, the Court would not invalidate
legislation merely because Congress had apparently favored one class or interest group over
another; such class-based legislation typified (pluralist) democratic processes. “It is of the
essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest of the regulated and that
advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts of economic interest
between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to
resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process.” Third,
and related to the prior point, the justices stressed that politics, not the judiciary, constrained
Congress’s power under the commerce clause. Congress, to be sure, did not possess unbounded
power, but the “effective restraints” on congressional power arose “from political rather than
from judicial processes.”70
would have held that a provision benefiting the unemployed amounted to class legislation favoring only partial or
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In 1937, the Court’s switch was conspicuous enough to be recognized by contemporary
observers; a New York Times banner headline “hailed [the] bench change.” Yet, the change was
not precisely revolutionary, nor for that matter, evolutionary. The switch was not
revolutionary—in the sense of being sudden and unanticipated—because the constitutional
system had been undergoing a gradual transition from republican to pluralist democracy. This
transition started with demographic, economic, and cultural pressures that traced back to before
the 1920s. These pressures built over the years until a transition in democracy became a fait
accompli; a reversal of direction became near-impossible. Hence, with hindsight, one might
reasonably conclude that, at some point, the Court’s alteration of judicial review, acknowledging
the new system of pluralist democracy, became foreordained, a corollary to systemic changes
already in place. From this perspective, the Blaisdell and Nebbia decisions might be
characterized not as mere will-o’-the-wisps, but rather as early manifestations of a gradual
transition. Yet, the 1937 Court switch should still not be depicted as merely an inevitable
moment in a long process of evolutionary change. True, the democratic structure for the switch
had been developing over the prior few years, but Roberts might not have switched his posture.
Not only had he previously resisted doing so, but in 1936, in one of the cases invalidating New
Deal legislation, he articulated a quintessential statement of mechanistic formalism: “When an
act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional
mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.” Moreover, FDR was not guaranteed the opportunity to replace
the Four Horsemen with new justices more sympathetic to the New Deal and pluralist
democracy. Hence West Coast Hotel and Jones and Laughlin did mark a distinct change in
judicial direction. Pressures may have been building for years, but the two weeks in 1937
marked the time when the earth quaked and a new terrain emerged.71
71
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Regardless of how the 1937 switch is characterized, the question arises: why did the
Court and particularly Roberts change direction at that point? No single clear answer is
apparent, though several factors seem pertinent. First, political pressure undoubtedly played a
role. The Four Horsemen remained too intransigent to respond to pressure, but Roberts and the
liberal justices were flexible enough to care that many of the Court’s decisions were being met
with widespread opprobrium. True, Roberts had already cast his vote in West Coast Hotel before
Roosevelt publicly announced his court-packing plan (though the Court’s decision was not
announced until afterward). Even so, in response to the Court’s series of anti-New Deal
decisions, administration insiders had been discussing for more than two months several possible
solutions, including a constitutional amendment. While details had not been publicly divulged,
administration leaks had created a buzz in Washington by the end of January 1937: Roosevelt
was preparing a major announcement about the Court.72
Second, by this time, not only was the practice of pluralist democracy well-established,
but intellectuals had been questioning the theoretical underpinnings of republican democracy for
more than a decade. In fact, the first threads of a pluralist democratic theory were already being
spun. While the justices may not have read, let’s say, Charles Merriam’s latest political science
tome, they would not have been oblivious to such intellectual rumblings. The Court was still
applying principles of democracy that had for years been under intellectual (as well as political)
attack; the Court’s concept of judicial review was an anachronism.73
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Finally, whatever factors prompted the Court’s switch in early 1937, personnel changes
on the Court would soon solidify its embrace of pluralist democracy. In May 1937, during the
heated congressional debates over the court-packing plan, which eventually would be defeated,
Justice Van Devanter resigned. Roosevelt finally had his first opportunity to name a new justice.
In August, after more than two months of proscratinating, FDR nominated Senator Hugo Black
of Alabama, a die-hard New Dealer. This first opening on the Court broke the dam, and
Supreme Court vacancies came rushing at Roosevelt. In 1938, he appointed Stanley F. Reed, his
solicitor general, to replace Sutherland, another of the Four Horsemen. The next year, FDR
appointed both his confidant, Felix Frankfurter, and then-chair of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, William O. Douglas to the Court. In 1940, it was attorney general Frank Murphy’s
turn. In 1941, Stone was promoted to Chief Justice, and Roosevelt appointed Robert H. Jackson,
who had been Murphy’s successor as attorney general, and South Carolina Senator James F.
Byrnes, who filled the seat of the last of the Four Horsemen, McReynolds. FDR made his final
appointment in 1943, naming Wiley B. Rutledge, whom Roosevelt had previously appointed to
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Hence, although FDR had been locked in a
constitutional confrontation with the Supreme Court from 1935 to 1937, by the end of his
presidency, he had created the “Roosevelt Court,” as political scientist C. Herman Pritchett
would call it in 1948.74
B. The Puzzle of Pluralist Democratic Judicial Review
Once the Court had accepted the structures of pluralist democracy, then judicial review
itself became problematic. Under republican democracy, courts had determined whether
governmental actions promoted either the common good or partial and private interests.
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Through this judicial process, courts demarcated a conceptual boundary between the public and
private realms. But when the Court stopped distinguishing between the common good and
partial or private interests—when the Court repudiated republican democracy—then the purpose
of judicial review blurred. The judicial function of limiting the government to acting within the
public sphere and therefore (supposedly) maximizing individual liberty within the private sphere
no longer seemed sensible. Moreover, if the structures of pluralist democracy logically implied a
new framework for exercising the power of judicial review, it was not readily apparent. How
were pluralist democratic courts to review the legitimacy—the constitutionality—of
governmental actions? From an intellectual standpoint, the justices confronted a typical
modernist dilemma. Under republican democracy, with its roots tracing back to a premodern
worldview, the foundation for objective judicial decision making was, in theory, indubitable: it
was the categorical specification of the common good and the consequent division between the
public and private realms. But now with the Court’s movement into the world of modernity,
with the Court accepting pluralist democracy, the firm republican foundation for decision
making had crumbled. The justices, it seemed, needed to find a new foundation to ground their
decisions.75
With the Court confronting the uncertainties of pluralist democracy and the puzzle of
judicial review, scholars and justices began worrying that judicial review itself was inconsistent
with democratic government—what Alexander Bickel would call the “counter-majoritarian
difficulty.”76 Soon after Congress rejected FDR’s court-packing plan, then-Assistant Attorney
General Robert Jackson gave a speech acknowledging the significance of the Court’s switch: it
“cleared the way toward improving the functioning of the United States.” Yet, he brooded that
75

Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought From Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual
Voyage 91 (2000) (discussing modernist epistemological difficulties); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in
Constitutional Scholarship, 88 Va. L. Rev. 485, 536-37 (2002) (discussing how epistemological developments of
early-twentieth century threatened the coherence of judicial decision making).
76

Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (2d ed. 1986; 1st ed. 1962); see Wiecek, supra
note 2, at 241 (emphasizing the difficulties confronting the Court after the 1937 switch).

Democratic Regimes - 37 -

potential “friction” between the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and Congress and the
executive, on the other hand, still “presents the most vexing problem.” Indeed, given that the
justices (and other federal judges) received lifetime appointments and thus were insulated from
political-democratic pressures—they could not be voted out of office—he insisted that “[e]ither
democracy must surrender to the judges or the judges must yield to democracy.” As Thomas
Reed Powell would explain, the “primary requisite of a democratic society is a fairly wide
popular participation,” so the Court, “not democratically organized and … least subject to
democratic pressure,” is inherently not “a democratic agency.”77
If Jackson presented the choice—the countermajoritarian dilemma, so to speak, where
either elected legislative representatives or unelected judges rule—then Judge Learned Hand
became one of the most articulate advocates for the legislative representatives—for democracy,
as he saw it. In a 1942 speech published by the Massachusetts Bar Association, Hand described
“enacted law” from a distinctly pluralist democratic vantage: legislation is enacted in response
“to the pressure of the interests affected” and “ordinarily [manifests] a compromise of conflicts.”
The succcess of such a law “depends upon how far mutual concessions result in an adjustment
which brings in its train the most satisfaction and leaves the least acrimony.” What about
judicial review of such laws? Hand insisted that judges must restrain their own powers with a
“self-denying ordinance.” Courts “should not have the last word in those basic conflicts of ‘right
and wrong,’” even in cases involving Bill of Rights’ guarantees. Such constitutional rights must
“serve merely as counsels of moderation.” They are precatory, and their specific implementation
and effect must depend on the people and their elected representatives. Hand realized that many
critics would fume that civil liberties could not survive without judicial protection. He
responded: “[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; … a
society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; … in a society which evades its
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responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will
perish.”78
Yet, other scholars were not as quick to abandon the Court’s power of judicial review on
the shoals of pluralist democracy, even if the Court acted in a counter-democratic fashion. And
to be sure, not all supporters of judicial review admitted that it contravened democracy. Eugene
Rostow, for one, argued that judicial review constituted an important part of pluralist democracy,
properly understood. “The task of democracy is not to have the people vote directly on every
issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility for the acts of their representatives, elected or
appointed.” That is, Rostow maintained that while federal judges might be politically insulated,
they are not politically isolated. The electorate bears “responsibility for the quality of the judges
and for the substance of their instructions, never a responsibility for [judicial] decisions in
particular cases.” Explicitly criticizing Hand’s position, Rostow attributed the desire to
straitjacket the Court’s power of judicial review to the lingering “dark shadows thrown upon the
judiciary by the Court-packing fight of 1937.”79
Why did the countermajoritarian difficulty become so central to judicial and scholarly
thinking in the pluralist democratic regime? To be sure, under republican democracy, the
judicial categorization of governmental actions as promoting either the common good or partial
or private interests sometimes provoked critics to charge that judges exercised too much
discretion. Moreover, judges could easily be denounced for thwarting legislative desires, as was
most evident during the New Deal. Yet, the potential for countermajoritarian judicial decision
making rarely seemed as distinct or momentous in the old (republican) democratic regime as it
would in the new (pluralist) one. Unsurprisingly, the respective characteristics of the two types
78
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of democracy structured the problems (or difficulties) that seemed to inhere within judicial
review. Unlike pluralist democracy, republican democracy did not stress widespread
participation and political pursuit of self-interest. The fact that judicial decisions might not
accord with the sentiments of the majority, thus, did not seem too problematic. Indeed, under
republican democracy, politics supposedly demanded the virtuous pursuit of the common good.
Even a judge, then, could be political without arousing indignation. If a judge were to decide in
a partisan fashion, however—in pursuit of self-interest (or a faction’s interests)—then the
judge’s decision would be corrupt.80
Under the new pluralist democratic regime, however, politics equaled partisanship; the
pursuit of self-interest had become legitimate and normal. Consequently, a judge who appeared
to be political was necessarily partisan, or so it seemed. Most important, then, many observers
had begun to view the Court through the prism of pluralist democratic interest group struggles.
The realist-inspired critiques of the rule of law, so predominant during the 1930s, had led many
to fear that adjudication was rudderless. Then after the 1937 switch, the justices themselves
added fuel to this fear. Starting in the early 1940s, they began writing an increasing number of
dissents and concurrences. By the 1946-1947 term, the percentage of unanimous opinions had
fallen to a then-record low of thirty-six percent.81 While the explanation for this development
remained obscure, one implication—suggested by political scientist C. Herman Pritchett—was
that the justices used their opinions to assert their respective interests and values.82 And even if
the justices were not crassly pursuing their own political preferences, they seemed, at best,
80

G. Edward White argues that Barry Friedman mischaracterizes criticisms of judicial decision making
under republican democracy as countermajoritarian. White, Arrival, supra note 75, at 527-28 & n.94; Friedman,
supra note 2, at 998-99.
81

82

Wilfred Binkley & Malcolm Moos, A Grammar of American Politics 525-26 (1949).

Pritchett attempted to explain the growing number of dissents by analyzing the political positions of the
justices. C. Herman Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44, 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 42 (1945); see David
M. O’Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions,
in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 91, 97, 102 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999) (suggesting other reasons for the increasing number of dissents and concurrences).

Democratic Regimes - 40 -

merely to referee among contesting interest groups. Indeed, led by Pritchett, post-war political
scientists largely accepted the realist critique of the rule of law and argued that the Supreme
Court was “a political institution performing a political function.”83 If true, if the Court
functioned to adjudicate among competing interests and values—if the Court, in fact, made law
that would gratify certain societal groups and disappoint others—then interest groups, it seemed,
ought to begin pressing their claims to the Court. Predictably, then, aided by changes in
Supreme Court rules, the number of amicus curiae briefs began to increase dramatically. By
1953, more than ten percent of the cases had at least one amicus. That year, Fowler V. Harper
and Edwin D. Etherington wrote that “[m]ore and more the Court was being treated as if it were
a political-legislative body, amenable and responsive to mass pressures from any source.” And
while Harper and Etherington fretted about this development, the number of amici continued to
grow; by 1993, more than ninety percent of the cases had at least one.84
While scholars buzzed about the Court’s countermajoritarian difficulty in a pluralist
democratic system, the justices themselves confronted the puzzle of judicial review in the most
practical of contexts: deciding cases. In the shadow of the Lochner-era Court’s aggressive
review of New Deal statutes, which had engendered the court-packing crisis, the Roosevelt Court
justices’ solution to this conundrum was clear in at least one realm. They were to presume the
constitutionality of any economic or social welfare legislation. In fact, for the next several
decades, courts would, in effect, rubber stamp all reasonable economic and social welfare
regulations (rather than questioning whether the action was for the common good). The
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quintessence of the Court’s 1937 switch, judicial deference to economic and social welfare
statutes was integral to the New Deal expansion of governmental power. Without the Court’s
extreme respect for such legislative actions, the government’s widereaching regulations of the
economy and society would constantly be called into doubt (as they had been during the Lochner
era). In 1938, the Court explained: “[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment
is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to
be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”85
But was the Court ever to review any governmental actions more closely, or had judicial
review transformed into one long series of rubber stamps? If the Court was to defer to economic
and social welfare statutes, should the Court defer as well to all other legislative actions, which
after all were now understood to be nothing more than the product of interest group competitions
and compromises? While the justices would disagree among themselves about the degree of
deference owed non-economic legislative actions, and while scholars, like Hand, might
recommend deference regardless of context, neither the Supreme Court justices nor the lower
federal court judges were likely to abrogate their power over other governmental actors. The
power of judicial review, particularly at the Supreme Court level, was too well-entrenched in the
structures and institutions of American government to fade to nothingness.86 Moreover, the
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sanctity of individual rights and liberties had become part of the American creed. In the realm of
free expression, the deeply entrenched tradition of dissent had long manifested an American
ethos of liberty. Then, if anything, the desire to protect individual liberties in general had
intensified between the two World Wars. The ACLU, forged in 1920 in the crucible of the postWorld War I Red Scare, had actively sought to stiffen Americans’ resolve to protect civil
liberties through an integrated campaign of education and litigation. Not incidentally, an
enhanced protection of individual liberty harmonized with the rise of the mass-consumer culture
during the 1920s. Mass-consumerism intensified the American individualist ethos by portraying
the person as a bundle of desires. Civil rights and liberties then became especially beneficial, it
seemed, to protect the individual’s legitimate quest for self-fulfillment.87
Two congressional developments from the mid-1930s illustrate how important the cause
of civil liberties had become in national politics. The first arose from the labor movement. After
Congress had passed the NLRA in July 1935, many employers fought compliance and thwarted
unionization through an assortment of strategies, such as industrial espionage. Generally
frustrated with such concerted efforts to oppose the law, and specifically outraged over the
treatment of Arkansas sharecroppers, Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr., spearheaded
the formation of a subcommittee, the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee, which conducted
over a four-year period “the most extensive investigation of civil liberties infractions ever
undertaken by a congressional committee.” Focusing on “the relation between civil liberty and
labor’s drive to organize,” the Committee reported startling and violent transgressions of liberty.
During the 1930s, the “principal private purchasers” of munitions and tear gas were employers
anticipating or resisting a strike. For instance, the Committee found that, during one month, the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company had “bought, in addition to $8,500 worth of [tear] gas
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equipment, 424 police clubs, six 12-gage repeating shotguns, 11,500 rounds of .38 caliber pistol
ammunition and 300 shotgun shells.”88 The second congressional development was in reaction
against FDR’s court-packing plan. Much of the debate revolved around whether the plan, if
implemented, would enfeeble the judicial protection of civil liberties. In fact, the adverse report
from the Committee of the Judiciary identified as primary reasons for rejecting the proposal that
it would undermine “the protection our constitutional system gives to minorities” and would
subvert “the rights of individuals.” To assure that the Court remain as a “defense of the liberties
of the people,” it must not be pressured to decide cases “out of fear or sense of obligation to the
appointing power.”89
Given such encomiums to civil liberties, the Court would not likely relinquish its power
of judicial review, especially in the contexts of the World War II and Cold War eras, as the
nation confronted the external menace of totalitarian governments. Fascists and Nazis
authoritatively dictated to their populaces, arbitrarily imposed punishments, and suppressed
religious, racial, and other minorities. In opposition, Americans stressed democracy, the rule of
law, including constitutional rights, and the protection of minorities—or so Americans now
wanted to believe. These ostensible components of American life and government separated us
from them. Thus, in Martin v. City of Struthers, decided during World War II, the Court struck
down the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness under an ordinance proscribing door-to-door
distributions of written materials.90 In reasoning that the application of this ordinance violated
the first amendment, Black’s majority opinion stressed that “[f]reedom to distribute information
… is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that … it must be fully preserved.”91
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Murphy’s concurrence, joined by Douglas and Rutledge, accentuated the difference between
American and totalitarian governments. “Repression has no place in this country. It is our proud
achievement to have demonstrated that unity and strength are best accomplished, not by enforced
orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible measure of freedom
of conscience and thought.”92
Finally, one more factor, central to pluralist democracy itself, ensured that the Court
would not cede its power of judicial review. Pluralist democracy had emerged partly because of
the actual expanding political power of outsider or peripheral groups, such as Irish Catholics,
Eastern European Jews, and laborers in general—a burgeoning power that undergirded the New
Deal. The flowering of this outsider political power, within the framework of the pluralist
democratic regime, threatened the status and influence of old-stock Americans, the dominant
elites. This threat was magnified because, under pluralist democracy, governmental power
expanded dramatically, especially at the national level. Thus, Protestant old-stock elites were
forced to retreat from their former hegemonic position, in which their interests and values were
often effectively translated into the republican democratic common good. Even as the dominant
elites necessarily acquiesced to the emergent pluralist democracy, they nonetheless refused to
abandon completely their long-held prerogatives of power and wealth. Rather, they sought to
retrench: forced to retreat, they searched for positions where they could fortify and thus protect
their dominant (though no longer hegemonic) interests and values. One such position of
fortification was in the courts.
After the 1937 switch, dominant elites implicitly understood that the judicial enforcement
of constitutional rights could provide a potential bulwark against the majoritarian threat posed by
the (pluralist) democratic empowerment of peripheral groups. Old-stock Americans thus sought
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“the constitutionalization” of their own interests and values—the designation of their interests
and values as constitutional rights enforceable through the courts.93 When constitutionalized as
judicially sanctioned rights, their interests and values were effectively protected from the
vagaries of the democratic processes—democratic processes that now included peripheral groups
and that therefore dangerously encompassed the interests and values of previously excluded
outsiders.94 Of course, dominant elites had long-understood the potential benefits of judicial
power. Throughout the Lochner era, they had protected their economic interests through the
mechanisms of the courts by seeking labor injunctions, the invalidation of labor laws as contrary
to the common good, and similar favorable judicial rulings. But even when the dominant elites
retreated in 1937—when economic regulation became subject to mere rational basis review—
they still sought to protect their interests and values through the judicial enforcement of noneconomic rights, including free expression and religious freedom.95
This strategy contributed especially to the judicial invigoration of first-amendment
freedoms. For instance, in a 1941 labor case, the Court reviewed whether an employer had
engaged in proscribed unfair labor practices under the NLRA. The employer, meanwhile,
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pressed a first-amendment free-expression claim. Remanding for additional proceedings, the
Court decided that the NLRB had made insufficient findings. The Court could not ascertain
whether the Board had concluded that either the employer’s utterances alone or the utterances
combined with other employer actions had constituted coercion, and hence an unfair labor
practice. The former possibility would be problematic. The first amendment, the Court
explained, protected the employer, who remained free to express “its view on labor policies or
problems.”96 Put in different words, because of first-amendment protections, “the utterances of
an employer, in themselves, may not constitutionallly be considered to constitute an unfair labor
practice.”97 As this case suggests, the Court’s post-1937 protection of civil liberties was not
necessarily favorable to disempowered peripheral groups: it was partly a conservative reaction
against pluralist democracy, with its inclusion of former outsiders and its expansive
governmental power.98 In a similar vein, the Court would subsequently hold that the first
amendment protected corporations seeking to spend money to influence voters and also limited
congressional power to restrict expenditures on political campaigns.99
For numerous reasons, then, the Court would continue to exercise its power of judicial
review, most significantly in cases involving civil liberties. But a doctrinal framework for
resolving such cases remained elusive, for the justices as well as for others. As Jackson would
understatedly lament: “[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete
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restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb selfconfidence.” Consequently, in a sense, the justices experimented, developing over the years
three primary approaches to pluralist democratic judicial review.100
The first approach began to emerge almost immediately after the Court’s 1937 switch. In
United States v. Carolene Products Company, decided in 1938, the Court upheld an economic
regulation that restricted the interstate shipment of certain types of milk. Stone’s majority
opinion showed great deference to Congress, as typified pluralist democratic judicial review of
economic and social welfare laws, but he added a footnote explaining that such deference might
sometimes be inappropriate. His famous footnote four, initially drafted by one of his clerks,
suggested that a “presumption of constitutionality” would be inappropriate if the democratic
process itself had been defective. Pluralist democracy, as the justices were just coming to
understand, required an open and free-wheeling legislative process. A legislative outcome was
legitimate not because it promoted the common good but because it arose from interest-group
competition and compromise. If the processes of competition and compromise were closed to
certain groups or otherwise defective—if the government had restricted, in Stone’s words, “those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation”—then the legitimacy of the legislative outcome was called into question. If
legislation, for instance, had prevented some groups from voting or organizing politically, then
Stone suggested it should “be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny;” the enactment did
not manifest a truly pluralist democratic process. Likewise, if the government intentionally
discriminated against a “discrete and insular” minority, like African Americans, then judicial
deference would be inappropriate. In a pluralist democratic regime, societal groups supposedly
could press their interests and values in a fair competition with other groups. But when the
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government intentionally discriminated against a group—against a discrete and insular
minority—then “the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities” would be undermined.101
Consistent with Stone’s footnote, almost all post-1937 justices agreed that the Court
should support pluralist democratic processes. Even so, the justices often disagreed about how to
achieve that judicial goal: how precisely could the Court best nurture pluralist democracy? One
group of justices, led by Frankfurter and Jackson, placed extraordinary trust in the self-corrective
powers of pluralist democracy. From their perspective, the Court generally ought to allow
pluralist democracy to rectify its own problems. The other group of justices, including Stone,
Douglas, and Black, insisted that the Court must be more vigilant in monitoring pluralist
democracy. Otherwise, it could too easily deteriorate into tyranny. The tension between these
two judicial camps animated the 1946 case of Colegrove v. Green, in which a plurality held that
the drawing of congressional district lines in Illinois presented a nonjusticiable political question.
Writing for the plurality, Frankfurter emphasized that the point of pluralist democracy, including
congressional districting, was to assure widespread participation in political processes. Yet,
Frankfurter added, pluralist democracy was inherently partisan, and the drawing of district lines
reflected “party contests and party interests.” The Court, Frankfurter concluded, should avoid
entering “this political thicket.” If a state legislature drew unfair district lines, the proper remedy
lay not in the courts but in the partisan democratic process itself: “to secure State legislatures
that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”102
Black, joined by Douglas and Murphy, dissented. Black agreed with Frankfurter that a
pluralist democratic system should promote widespread participation. He disagreed, however,
with Frankfurter’s reasoning that the best way to promote participation was to allow the further
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operation of legislative processes, particularly in the midst of a districting dispute. Instead,
Black underscored that the current district lines in Illinois engendered grossly disparate
representation. Some districts had fewer than 200,000 people, while one district had more than
900,000, yet each district, regardless of population, could elect one representative.
Consequently, each vote was not accorded “equal weight;” a vote in a high-population district
was worth less than a vote in a low-population district. According to Black, “[a]ll groups,
classes, and individuals shall to the extent that it is practically feasible be given equal
representation in the House of Representatives, which, in conjunction with the Senate, writes the
laws affecting the life, liberty, and property of all the people.”103 Thus, the Court could not trust
the pluralist democratic process to self-correct in this instance precisely because the challenged
legislation prevented certain groups from fully participating, from having adequate opportunity
to influence future legislative actions.
Despite such disagreements among the justices, John Hart Ely would eventually develop
Stone’s footnote-four approach into a full-fledged theory of judicial review: representation
reinforcement. Other approaches to pluralist democratic judicial review foundered on the
countermajoritarian difficulty, but Ely explained why representation reinforcement (or Stone’s
footnote-four approach) was different—and why it would persistently appeal to the Court and
scholars. Properly understood, representation reinforcement theory dissolved the
countermajoritarian difficulty because it promoted and bolstered rather than undermining
democracy. The Court, Ely argued, should generally presume the constitutionality of legislative
decisions. Regardless of the outcome of the legislative process, the Court should not disapprove
legislation as contravening some substantive criterion, like the common good, because no such
criterion existed (or, at least, the justices could not reliably identify such a criterion). Legislative
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goals supposedly manifested no more than the interests and values of the democratic winners.
As the Court explained in 1955, “[t]he day is gone when this Court [strikes down] laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”104 Yet, Ely reasoned, the Court could
review the processes that had led the legislature to take aim at one substantive goal rather than
another. If those processes were fair and open, then the Court must defer to the legislative
choice. But if the processes appeared skewed, then the Court should scrutinize the legislation
more closely. Judicial invalidation of legislation that had arisen from a defective or
malfunctioning democratic process would not be countermajoritarian. It would be the very
opposite: it would foster fair and open pluralist democracy. The Court’s role, in short, was to
police the democratic process.105
A second approach to judicial review in the pluralist democratic regime required the
justices to balance competing interests. Throughout the 1930s, legal realists had criticized the a
priori formalism characteristic of Lochner-era judicial decisions. Judges could not resolve cases
by mechanically applying abstract doctrinal categories, like the common good, to clear and
certain facts. In any particular dispute, they argued, opposed parties asserted competing interests
and values, which courts should balance or weigh against each other. No higher criteria existed
for resolving disputes.106 Starting in the late 1930s, even as the realists’ broadside critique of the
rule of law fell into disfavor, the Court followed this cue and resolved an increasing number of
constitutional issues by balancing interests. In the balancing calculus, constitutional rights were
treated as political interests to be weighed against other interests, particularly governmental or
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state interests. For instance, in Schneider v. State, decided in 1939, the Court invalidated a
conviction under an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of hand-bills. Roberts’s opinion, for
an eight-justice majority, explained:
In every case … where legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts should
be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed
at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the
delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of the rights.
In this case, then, the Court concluded that the individual’s first amendment interest in
distributing literature outweighed the government’s interest in preventing littering.107
Such balancing tests soon became commonplace in numerous contexts, not only in
individual-rights cases but in others as well. For example, in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Incorporated, the Court held that a state law regulating the shipment of fresh fruit violated the
negative implications of the commerce clause (or, in other words, the dormant commerce
clause). “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
The Court elaborated the balance: “If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.”108
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The Court’s third approach to pluralist democratic judicial review had also been
suggested by Stone in his Carolene Products footnote four. Besides emphasizing the protection
of democracy, he wrote: “[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments.” Stone cited two first-amendment cases
that had invalidated restrictions on free expression.109 For a brief period afterward, the Court
called these protected liberties “preferred freedoms”—freedoms or rights that deserved special
judicial protection. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, decided in 1943, the Court stated
that “[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”
While suggested by Stone in footnote four, the preferred-freedoms doctrine had historical roots
winding back even earlier to the so-called incorporation doctrine. Early in the twentieth century,
the Court had begun to hold that the fourteenth amendment due process clause incorporated or
implicitly included various Bill of Rights’ guarantees, which then applied against state and local
governments just as they applied against the national government. As recently as 1937, in Palko
v. Connecticut, Cardozo had reasoned that due process encompassed Bill of Rights’ protections
integral to “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.” Such rights rested within “a
‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.’” During the 1940s, some of these incorporated (fundamental) rights were
denominated preferred freedoms, distinguishing them from economic liberties. The government
could regulate economic relations whenever reasonable, but it could not so readily restrict the
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preferred liberties. Hence, the Murdock Court invalidated a regulation on the sale of religious
literature by emphasizing that the government sought to restrict a preferred freedom (religious
freedom) rather than a commercial transaction (the sale of literature). After the 1940s, however,
the justices rarely invoked the preferred-freedoms doctrine.110
While the preferred-freedoms doctrine per se fell into desuetude, the underlying principle
did not. The point was to protect certain liberties or interests from the pluralist democratic
process itself, regardless of whether the liberties were called preferred freedoms. Thus, justices
and scholars would occasionally assert that the Constitution carved certain areas out of the
pluralist democratic process, placing them beyond the majoritarian reach. During World War II,
Jackson wrote: “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.”111 And subsequently, Black and Douglas suggested that the absolute protection of
free expression was warranted. According to Black, when the first amendment declares that
“Congress shall make no law,” it means that “Congress shall make no law.”112 This judicial
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approach rested on a key assumption: that certain liberties and interests are so important they
should not be exposed to the vagaries of the pluralist democratic process—which, after all,
encourages individuals and groups to pursue their own interests to the disregard of others. The
pluralist admonition to pursue self-interest engenders possibilities too dangerous to abide. To
take an obvious example, a democratic majority might decide to satisfy its interests by forcing a
particular minority into slavery. To be sure, one might argue that such a slavery law would
necessarily undermine pluralist democratic processes by excluding the would-be slaves from
political participation (thus triggering heightened judicial scrutiny under representation
reinforcement). Yet, what if the courts were to disagree? What if a defect in the process of
enacting the slavery law could not be proven in court? The crux of the third judicial approach—
the protection from pluralist democracy—is that some liberties and interests simply should not
depend on such uncertainties.113
Even so, a majority of justices rarely agreed that any right, free speech or otherwise,
should be absolutely protected, regardless of context. Instead, they allowed the government to
argue that infringement of the right was, in the circumstances, appropriate. This flexibility
typically led back to a balancing test. The justices weighed the constitutional rights-interests
against competing interests. The Court, though, would often put its collective thumb on one side
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of the scale: the justices generally accorded individual rights, especially those expressly
enumerated in the constitutional text, like free speech and equal protection, extra weight in the
balance. The Court, in a sense, created no-fly zones (where pluralist majorities could not go),
but simultaneously acknowledged that the zones could be infringed for sufficiently important or
compelling reasons. During World War II, for instance, the Court upheld the national
government’s internment of Japanese-Americans in the face of an equal protection challenge.
The Court found that equal protection effectively created a no-fly zone, but the Court allowed the
government to justify infringement pursuant to a balancing test, albeit one supposedly skewed
strongly toward the protection of individual rights. “[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional,” the Court explained. “It is to say that courts must subject them
to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.” Thus, the so-called strict scrutiny test, a refined
balancing test, originated in the Court’s post-1937 struggle to solve the riddle of pluralist
democratic judicial review. The Court has used strict scrutiny in a variety of circumstances,
ranging from equal protection to religious freedom. For years, the Court required the
government to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws that burdened the free exercise
of religion unless the government could show that the law was necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. The Court, it should be added, did not use strict scrutiny in every individual rights
case. Sometimes, the Court would put its thumb on the scale, but apply less pressure. Hence,
the justices might apply heightened but less than strict scrutiny. In this manner, the Court has
upheld governmental regulations on commercial expression if the restrictions advance a
“substantial” governmental interest.114
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Two of the Court’s approaches to judicial review—balancing of interests, and removal
from pluralist democracy (creating no-fly zones)—exacerbated the hand-wringing over the
countermajoritarian difficulty. Critics condemned balancing as a subterfuge for judicial decision
making without principles, without law. To instruct courts to balance interests does not
adequately specify what qualifies as an interest (and thus becomes part of the balancing
calculus), what weight should be accorded to different interests, or even how different kinds of
interests can be weighed or compared. How, for instance, would one weigh an interest in
economic prosperity against an interest in speaking freely? They are the proverbial apples and
oranges (though it would be easier to balance apples and oranges). Constitutional issues often
“demand the appraisal and balancing of human values which there are no scales to weigh,”
Learned Hand observed. “Who can say whether the contributions of one group may not justify
allowing it a preference? How far should the capable, the shrewd or the strong be allowed to
exploit their powers?” As Hand elucidated, the problem “does not come from ignorance, but
from the absence of any standard, for values are incommensurable.” Even more important, given
the omnipresent worries about the countermajoritarian difficulty, if legislatures enacted laws in
response to competing interests, and the Court resolved disputes by balancing countervailing
interests, then what was the difference between legislative and judicial decision making?
Legislatures and courts, the critics charged, should do more than provide different forums for
competing interest groups to do battle. And if the Court lacked some better justification for
invalidating legislative actions, other than that the Court’s assessment of the parties’ interests
differed from the legislature’s assessment, then the Court should defer to the people’s elected
legislative representatives.115
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To be sure, the justices seemed concerned that balancing provided only a makeshift
solution to the problem of pluralist democratic judicial review, but it was a solution that
persisted, perhaps because of the lack of adequate alternatives. After the 1937 switch, it seemed,
the justices realized the mechanism of judicial review needed repair, but they were uncertain
how to fix it. So they dug down into the bottom of the toolbox, pulled out the electrical tape,
started wrapping it around, and tried to fix the problem as best as possible. The sociological
(Progressive) jurisprudents had recommended that the Court assess social interests, but for the
purpose of more accurately discerning the republican democratic common good. For what
purpose now, under the new democratic regime, was the Court to weigh competing interests—
other than to repeat the pluralist legislative process? Regardless, the tape-job held the judicial
mechanism together, though the justices brooded over their flimsy patchwork. At times, they
seemed defensive, attempting to justify balancing as truly principled. “[S]triking the balance
implies the exercise of judgment,” Frankfurter wrote. “It must be an overriding judgment
founded on something much deeper and more justifiable than personal preference. As far as it
lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal judgment. It must rest on fundamental
presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed.”116
As problematic as balancing seemed, the judicial removal protection of certain liberties
and interests from the reach of pluralist democratic majorities proved even more so. This
approach to judicial review had to confront the countermajoritarian whammy twice: first, in the
creation of the no-fly zones; and second, in the application of balancing tests to determine, in any
particular case, whether infringement of a zone was appropriate. While some critics argued that
the Court should never recognize no-fly zones, a larger number insisted the zones should cover
only those rights expressly enumerated in the constitutional text, such as free speech in the first
amendment. To these latter critics, like Robert Bork, the justices were obligated to uphold
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legislative actions unless clearly contravened by the Constitution, which at least in theory also
manifested the will of the people. Bork and like-minded scholars thus became especially
vitriolic when the Court began to invoke the right of privacy, an unenumerated right.117
III. Roe and Judicial Review Under Pluralist Democracy
Just as Allgeyer and Lochner epitomized the methods and problems of judicial review
under republican democracy, Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade embodied the methods
and problems of judicial review under pluralist democracy. In Griswold, decided in 1965, the
Court invalidated a Connecticut statute proscribing the use of contraceptives, even by married
couples. Douglas wrote a majority opinion joined by four other justices. Two additional
justices, John M. Harlan and Byron White, concurred in the judgment while writing their own
opinions. Given that Douglas’s opinion relied on a constitutionally protected right of privacy—a
right nowhere expressly enumerated in the Constitution—all of the justices worried that the
decision would appear analogous to Lochner, which had relied on the unenumerated liberty to
contract.118
As Douglas prepared his opinion for the Griswold majority, he was pressured to
contemplate the potential link with Lochner. Douglas initially circulated a draft opinion relying
on the first amendment right of association, but Justice William J. Brennan responded with a
letter encouraging Douglas to beware the ghost of Lochner. Brennan explained that while
Douglas’s draft did not invoke substantive due process, his reasoning “may come back to haunt
us just as Lochner did.” Douglas rarely revised his opinions, yet this time he did so, attempting
to deflect the analogy to Lochner. In his final opinion, Douglas insisted that the Lochner Court
had exercised political discretion, but the Griswold Court would not: “We do not sit as a super-
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legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”119
Moreover, while Douglas retained his original discussion of the right of association, he added an
extensive discussion of privacy. He reasoned that the first amendment as well as several other
Bill of Rights’ guarantees produce or emanate “penumbras” of privacy.120 These various
penumbras, Douglas explained, combine to generate a “zone of privacy”—a whole greater than
the sum of its parts (the respective penumbras).121 He then concluded that the anti-contraception
law infringed the protected zone of privacy. Returning to his original focus on association, he
emphasized that if the law were not invalidated, it would burden the marital relationship (or
association).122
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The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
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Id. at 485-86.
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As was true of Douglas, the other justices wrote their opinions in the shadow of Lochner.
Black’s and Stewart’s dissents accentuated the countermajoritarian difficulty and the seeming
similarity between the Griswold and Lochner decisions. “My point is that there is no provision
of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a
supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws
because of the Court’s belief that the legislative policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise,
arbitrary, capricious or irrational,” wrote an exasperated Black. “The adoption of such a loose,
flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved,
will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am
constrained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.”123 Numerous
constitutional scholars similarly attacked the Griswold decision. Bork and Raoul Berger
declared that the Court had undermined the democratic process, while Paul Kauper and Alfred
Kelly insisted that the Court, like in Lochner, had illegitimately relied on substantive due
process.124
Nonetheless, Griswold served as the springboard for Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973. Roe
invalidated the Texas anti-abortion laws, which prohibited abortions except “for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother.” After the initial oral argument, a five-to-two majority favored
striking down the Texas statutes as unconstitutionally void for vagueness (two new justices,
Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist, had been confirmed by the Senate but had not yet
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joined the Court). Justice Harry Blackmun circulated a draft opinion, which did not reach the
merits of the underlying substantive constitutional claim, but the justices then decided to have
the case reargued the following term before a full Court.125 After reargument, the majority now
favored invalidating the anti-abortion laws on the merits. Blackmun circulated a new draft
opinion that would permit states to proscribe abortions after the first trimester of a woman’s
pregnancy. Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall suggested expanding the protected right so
that states would not be allowed to prohibit abortions until viability, after the second trimester.
Blackmun’s final opinion followed this recommendation.126
Unlike Douglas’s Griswold opinion, Blackmun’s Roe opinion explicitly relied on
substantive due process, thus openly risking comparisons to Lochner. Recognizing this danger,
he immediately sought to deflect it by insisting that the Court had decided Roe objectively, “by
constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection.” To support this claim to
objectivity, Blackmun extensively reviewed the history of anti-abortion laws. He argued that the
history demonstrated abortion had traditionally been legal; anti-abortion laws were an anomaly
introduced mostly in the late-nineteenth century.127 Blackmun then focused on the right of
privacy. He admitted that it was an unenumerated right, not express in the constitutional text,
but he reasoned that its existence had been clearly settled in earlier judicial precedents,
particularly Griswold. Most important, Blackmun wrote, the right of privacy included a
woman’s interest in choosing whether to have an abortion: “This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s
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reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.”128
Putting this in different words, Blackmun reasoned that the right of privacy established a
no-fly zone encompassing a right to choose. State anti-abortion laws could infringe that zone
only if necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Thus, the Court balanced the
competing interests, as it so often does in pluralist democratic judicial review. In weighing the
various state interests against a woman’s interest in choosing, Blackmun developed the Roe
trimester framework. During the first trimester of a pregnancy, the state is prohibited from
restricting abortions in any manner. During the second trimester, the state’s interest in protecting
the health of pregnant women justified state regulations of abortions but solely for the purpose of
protecting pregnant women. Finally, after viability and during the third trimester, the state’s
“interest in protecting the potentiality of human life” is so strong as to justify state prohibitions
of abortions, unless “necessary to preserve the life or health” of the pregnant woman.129
With the exception of Chief Justice Burger’s brief concurrence, all of the concurring and
dissenting opinions revolved around the countermajoritarian difficulty and the ghost of Lochner.
Justices Rehnquist’s and White’s dissents denounced Blackmun’s claim to objectivity. Roe was,
quite simply, Lochner all over again: the Court illegitimately engaged in “judicial legislation” to
protect an unenumerated right under the guise of substantive due process.130 Naturally, many
constitutional scholars raised similar criticisms to the Roe decision. John Hart Ely, for instance,
insisted that the Roe Court had exceeded its institutional limitations by balancing interests in a
legislative manner. Moreover, Ely added, Roe had followed “the philosophy of Lochner;” Roe
and Lochner were “twins to be sure.”131 Bork, too, rode to the attack. The Court had once again
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undermined democracy by assuming legislative prerogatives: “[N]ot one sentence [in Roe]
qualifies as legal argument,” Bork fumed. Whatever one might think of “the right to abort, [it] is
not to be found in the Constitution.” The Court had “legislated the rules [it] considered
appropriate for abortions by balancing the interests of the woman and those of the state.” Roe,
consequently, manifested “the assumption of illegitimate judicial power and a usurpation of the
democratic authority of the American people.”132
In the face of such criticisms of Roe and Griswold, as no-fly-zone cases based on
unenumerated rights, numerous scholars stepped forward to defend the Court’s decisions. Many
scholars rejected the constrained originalist vision of judicial review proffered by Bork and his
ilk. They argued, first, that even expressly protected rights, such as free speech, were ambiguous
and required judicial interpretation, and second, that the constitutional text itself did not suggest
the Court should be limited to recognizing only enumerated rights. The ninth amendment—
“[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people”—suggested that the framers themselves did not believe
in an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. Moreover, numerous scholars insisted
that, regardless of the precise language of the Constitution or the intentions of the framers, the
Court’s function in constitutional cases was to articulate our society’s fundamental values—to
identify them as no-fly zones—whether based on neutral principles, moral philosophy, tradition,
societal consensus, or some other source of value and meaning (like natural law). For some
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scholars, the right of privacy manifested a societal commitment to individual autonomy and
integrity: no woman should be forced to carry a pregnancy through to birth if she did not wish to
do so. Other scholars argued that the abortion issue presented a prototypical question of
equality. Regardless of Ely’s arguments, anti-abortion laws manifested purposeful
discrimination against women because the government forced only women, not men, to
relinquish control of their bodies for the good of another being.133
IV. Conclusion: Comparing Lochner with Roe?
Lochner was decided under republican democracy, while Roe was decided under pluralist
democracy. Having been decided under different democratic regimes, the two cases should not
be analogized as if they were of the same kind. To be sure, both cases can be criticized and
praised, but to do so sensibly, each must be criticized and praised separately. Each case must be
understood in accordance with the proper background context, in accordance with the
appropriate democratic regime. To criticize Lochner based on the tenets of pluralist democracy
is ahistorical and misleading. To criticize Roe as being Lochner all over again, as if there were
no difference between unenumerated rights cases decided under pluralist democracy and
republican democracy is likewise ahistorical and misleading.
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True, the Roe Court justices themselves worried about potential similarities between Roe
and Lochner (as was also true of the Griswold Court justices). Yet, the justices’ attitudes do not
diminish the importance of the basic point: that the two cases were decided in fundamentally
different democratic regimes. The justices’ concerns about the potential case comparisons do not
establish the validity of the ostensible analogy. Rather, their concerns suggest the state of the
Roe-era legal culture vis-à-vis Lochner. The legal community had forgotten republican
democracy; it had erased from memory the structures of republican democratic judicial review.
Why? For one reason, this effacement of republican democracy facilitated the condemnation of
Lochner-era cases as pure political decisions. In the story of the Lochner-era that was being told
circa 1973, when Roe was decided, the Lochner Court justices were arch-conservatives who
corruptly twisted judicial review so they could impose their political values on a people
overwhelmingly favoring the liberal New Deal. This story justified post-1937 Supreme Court
decision making as harmonious with the traditional structures of judicial review, which the
Lochner-era justices had supposedly disregarded.134
This story also facilitated the promotion of the nation’s interests during the Cold War.
Coming on the heels of the country’s World War II confrontation with the Nazis, the Cold War
locked the United States in a struggle with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of emerging Third
World nations. Given the now-condemned racist practices of the Nazis, and given the need to
appeal to people of color in Third World countries, the nation sought to claim that American
democracy stood for liberty and equality for all, regardless of race, color, creed, or gender. To
make such a claim, Americans needed to forget how the nation had systematically excluded
blacks, women, and other religious and racial outsiders from participating in politics for most of
the nation’s history.135 In other words, the nation needed to forget its republican democratic past,
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when the principles of civic virtue and the common good justified political exclusion and
subjugation. Thus, in the 1950s, we find books like The Liberal Tradition in America, where
Louis Hartz argues that the United States was born liberal. Its lack of a feudal past, according to
Hartz, ensured its initial commitment to freedom, equality, and property. As Hartz phrased it,
“Burke equaled Locke in America.”136
Roe’s critics, it should be added, found this effacement of the republican democratic past
advantageous (though I do not mean to suggest that this collective amnesia was some type of
conscious conspiracy). It was far easier to condemn Roe as being Lochner all over again if one
disregarded (or was unaware of) the significant differences between the pluralist and republican
democratic regimes. Each regime had its own unique tenets or principles, and because of those
differences, each also had distinctive structures for (and problems of) judicial review. In short,
Lochner and Roe are incommensurable, decided within different paradigms of democracy.
Lochner should be evaluated within the parameters of republican democracy, while Roe should
be evaluated within the parameters of pluralist democracy. Thus, one might ask whether the
Lochner Court correctly distinguished the common good from partial or private interests within
the context of that case. And one might ask whether the Roe Court correctly identified the right
of privacy as a no-fly zone as well as correctly weighing the state’s interests against a woman’s
interest in choice. But one should not reverse these questions, asking for instance whether the
Roe Court correctly identified the common good. This question would be no more coherent
within the pluralist democratic regime than asking whether the Court properly balanced
competing interests within the republican democratic regime.
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